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1. INTRODUCTION I 
In recent years developments in what used to be the Soviet Union have 
presented themselves as a pileup of dramatic and at the same time chaotic 
and unpredictable events. There has been, however, a certain logic in this 
apparent chaos. Post-communist societies and structures follow their own 
lines of development, featuring certain characteristic contradictions and 
conflicts. The events of August 1991 boosted and brought to the surface 
a number of smouldering processes, which in the new situation after the 
attempted coup, soon brought about the collapse of the old structures and 
institutions of the Soviet state. 
One should not, however, consider the developments in Russia and the 
former Soviet Union only in the light of collapse and disintegration. New 
political forces are emerging, although slowly, new state structures are 
being created, and the search is beginning for new ideological conceptions 
capable of filling the vacuum created by the disintegration of communism. 
One of the cardinal questions seems to be: what kind of political 
structures will supersede the communist superpower? But before embarking 
on forecastings, let us glance at the most recent past. In the following 
paragraphs I will try to determine the general outlines of the evolution of 
"perestroika" and its place in the process leading to the disintegration of 
Soviet communism and the Soviet state. I will then discuss the attempted 
coup of August 1991 and the reasons for its defeat. Prospects for the 
future evolution of internal and intra-republican relations will be discussed 
in the last parts of the essay. 
2. THE RISE AND FALL OF PERESTROlKA 
The restructuring period was far from being a continuous and monotonous 
period of development for Soviet society. It is possible, therefore, to speak 
about stages or phases in the rise and fall of perestroika. 
The first phase of perestroika is made up by the years 1985-1987, the 
time of moderate communist liberalization. It had been launched by 
Gorbachev after his accession to power as an attempt to revitalize the 
command economy without disturbing the power establishment. There was 
1 Dr. Lilliia Shevtsova is Deputy Director of the Institute for International 
Political and Economic Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow. 
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to be more candour and openness, and some odious limitations on civil 
rights were abolished. In the economic field, however, Gorbachev did not 
dare to begin even superficial reforms of the existing system along the 
lines which had already been tried in for instance Hungary, Poland and 
Yugoslavia. Soviet society was still not affected too much by the new 
policies and drowsed on. One could feel, however, the first signs of 
approaching awakening, particularly concerning · the· national question! 
However, the reforms of this first stage failed to revitalize the Soviet 
economy. and the old structures were kept intact. 
This forced Gorbachev to pass on to the second stage of perestroika, 
comprising the years 1987-1990, which could be characterized as 
communist reforming. But whatever the original intentions of the 
perestroika ideologists might have been, this stage ultimately led to the 
· upsurge of democratic and national-liberationalist aspirations in all parts 
of Soviet society. For the Union leader himself these were the years of the 
most radical reformist policy. The radicalization was facilitated in that by 
now Gorbachev had managed to neutralize his main rivals, particularly 
Egor Ligachev, and to consolidate his own power.' By the beginning of 
1988 Gorbachev obviously came to the conclusion that political reforms 
were necessary. It was at this very point that the transfer of power from 
the highest party structures to the State started. During the whole of 1988, 
for instance, the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU did not 
convene for a single meeting. One key factor in Gorbachev's idea of 
reform was the revitalization of the Soviets (councils); what was called the 
return to the Leninist style of rally-based democracy. Until then, the 
Soviets had served the monopolistic power of the CPSU, without having 
real power or authority of their own. It proved difficult, however, to make 
the Soviets the seat of effective authority. 
But the essence of this second stage did not lie in Gorbachev's reformist 
escapades. This was the time when the real awakening of the society, or 
1 I have in mind the events in Alma Ata, Kazakhstan, in December 1986. The 
local population pmtested against the replacement, decided in Moscow, of the 
corrupt Kazakh leader Kunaev with Kolbin, a Russian. Unfortunately, this omen 
was not properly appreciated. 
' There is some doubt whether Ligachev was really a serious danger to 
Gorhachev. Another interpretation could be that this conservative was needed by 
Gorbachev to act as a symbol of the "extreme right", distracting public 
dissatisfaction and playing scapegoat. 
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at least parts of it, started. There was an upsurge of so-called informal 
groupings and organizations that would later serve as a basis for the 
creation of non-communist political parties. Also for the first time in 
decades an opposition had emerged within the CPSU itself. This oppo-
sition would soon coalesce into the Democratic Platform. The formation 
of national-patriotic movements in individual republics gained momentum. 
A peak was reached in 1989 in Soviet society's participation in political 
activity. There were relatively free elections to the new supreme body of 
political authority, the Congress of People's Deputies. These elections also 
demonstrated the feebleness of the position of the party nomenklatura. The 
first sessions of the Congress acted as a Union-wide training ground for 
democratic thinking and behaviour. The nucleus of a parliamentary 
opposition was formed by the Interrepublican Group of Deputies. On the 
grass-root level, the miners launched a powerful mass movement of their 
own, demonstrating that the working class had now entered the political 
scene.• 
In 1990 the movements and tendencies which had been set in motion in 
the preceding years went on gaining momentum. In the spring the local 
and republican elections increased the influence of radical and moderate 
forces. Boris Eltsin was elected as Chairman of the RSFSR Supreme 
Soviet in May, and the three Baltic republics· proceeded on their way 
towards independence. It became steadily clearer that developments in the 
Soviet Union had slipped away from the Centre's control and entered a 
new phase. 
A struggle had started not only between the political movements, both 
established ones and those being formated, but between the Centre and 
individual republics as well. The nomenklatura forces were taken unawares 
by this billow of events. But already from the end of 1989 they gradually 
regained composure and started to consolidate. What was happening came 
no doubt as a shock to Gorbachev, who could hardly have been prepared 
for the chain reaction that followed his cautious reforms of the authori-
tarian system. From now on Gorbachev became involved in a new phase 
4 Needless to say, international events also influenced the situation in the Soviet 
Union, particularly the wave of democratic revolutions in Eastern Europe which 
led to the collapse of the communist system there. In this paper I have chosen, 
however, to concentrate on internal factors, although the importance of external 
stimuli on this and other occasions is obvious. 
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of political activity in which he had to struggle to confine the effects of 
the reform he himself had launched. 
Meanwhile perestroika entered the third stage of its development, the 
phase of open antagonism of political forces (September 1990 - August 
1991). If 1989 and the first half of 1990 had been marked by the 
onslaught of democratic and national liberation movements, in the fall of 
1990 the right wingers went on assault. The conservatives had created 
their own structures, like the "Soyuz" movement in the Union parliament 
and the Russian Communist Party. Gorbachev seemed to have given up 
even limited reformist activities, embarking instead on the consolidation 
of his personal power. Having succeeded in securing for himself the new 
title of Soviet president, he seemed to push the other "perestroika 
structures" into the background. 
First, at the end of 1990 active preparation for an antireformist coup 
began. It became clear that the conservatives tried to attract the President 
to their side and succeeded. It might take some time before the reasons 
for Gorbachev's "turn to the right" at that moment can be realized. Did 
he become a hostage of the conservative forces, unable to look for support 
from the left wing, which was still feeble and often critical of his 
policies? Maybe he was a prisoner of his own political stereotypes and 
beliefs, unwilling to waive even a fraction of his power? These and other 
considerations may have played a role in Gorbachev's sliding to a 
conservative stance at the end of 1990. 
The events in the Baltic republics in January 1991 should be seen as dress 
rehearsal of the reaction's scheme. It was a simple one: so-called "national 
salvation committees" had been cropping up, allegedly "initiated by the 
masses", although the guiding hand of the local party structures could 
easily be discerned behind them. The committees were to call on the 
Soviet Army to rescue and help "misguided" republics return to the bosom 
of a unitary state. The leaders of the Russian Communist Party had started 
bracing themselves for a similar option. But the scenario flopped; even the 
events in the Persian Gulf could not serve as a smoke screen for the party 
conspirators. The second attempt at a coup was made at the end of March 
the same year, when tanks were summoned to the capital to bring the 
riotous Russian parliament to heel. And again it flopped. The reason for 
the conservatives' failure to realize their plans lies in the vacillations of 
Gorbachev himself. Although he wanted to restore his power and hold 
back the disintegration of the Union, this could not be done at the price 
of bloodshed, whereby he would sacrifice his international image as Nobel 
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prize winner. He also probably understood that if the democratic 
movement was completely destroyed he would have to face the right 
wingers. They would hardly forgive a policy of even moderate perestroika. 
Then, in the spring of 1991, Gorbachev "turned to the left" and began a 
dialogue with Boris Eltsin and the leaders of eight of the other republics. 
How should one evaluate the significance of the process which led to the 
Novo Ogarevo talks? All the participants in the dialogue obviously 
pursued their own aims. But it was still important that for the first time 
the parties seemed to be giving up direct confrontation for direct discus-
sions at the negotiating table. The core of the situation seemed to be that 
the Centre had lost much of its power and authority, while the new 
republican structures were still weak and incomplete. The resulting draft 
Union Treaty did not present solutions to the important dilemmas. 
Still, the model of a new federation was met with fierce opposition from 
the right These forces were not willing to contemplate even a limited 
expansion of the role played by the republics. The Union bureaucracy also 
felt threatened by the prospects of a looser federation. Nor was the 
proposed structure satisfactory from Eltsin' s point of view. It would 
infringe upon the sovereign rights of Russia and subject it to the power 
of both the centre and the other republics, the majority of which had a 
rather conservative leadership at the time. The draft agreement, therefore, 
although being an attempt at a compromise, hardly suited anybody. 
An attempt to curtail the Novo Ogarevo process was made on June 17, 
when Prime Minister V. Pavlov demanded from the Supreme Soviet that 
he should be granted additional powers and declared that extraordinary 
measures should be applied in the country. He was supported by a triad 
of the mightiest ministers: Kriuchkov- the chairman of the KGB; Yawv-
minister of defence; and Pogo - the minister for internal affairs. Although 
the assault failed - whatever its nature and Gorbachev' s role in it - it was 
a warning of things to come. 
Since May, the signs of the coming showdown had been increasing in 
number. For instance, 0. Baklanov, who later took part in the August 
conspiracy, stated in the reactionary paper Den' in May that "the Army 
is ready to take up the government of the society". Then Sovetskaia 
Rossiia published the "Oration to the nation", which in fact was nothing 
short of a counterreformist manifesto. 5 Other events pointed in the same 
5 Sovetskaia Rossiia, July 23, 1991. 
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direction, for instance the attacks on the Lithuanian border posts. All this 
culminated in the events of August. These events marked the end of 
Soviet restructuring, for there was nothing left to restructure. Old 
structures had crumbled away and new ones had yet to be created. But 
no less imponant, the failed coup showed the utter impossibility of a 
forced return to pre-perestroika Soviet society, to the Soviet empire and 
the system of Party totalitarianism. 
3. THE TURN IN AUGUST: ESSENCE AND AFTERMATH 
The fourth and final stage of perestroika, the events of August 1991, was 
hardly an attempted coup d'etat in the classical sense of the word. The 
initiators came from the top level of the hierarchy of power. They 
belonged to Gorbachev's close environment, and six out of the eight 
members of the State Committee for the State of Emergency had been 
nominated to their posts by the President himself. Gorbachev's own place 
in the plot is a matter for discussion. It is hard to disagree with Eduard 
Shevarnadze who noted that although Gorbachev might not have been 
directly involved in the conspiracy, he had done nothing to forestall it. 
The aim of the conspirators was to launch a process of rightist counter-
reformation. They wanted to stop the disintegration of the Union, to 
restore the unitary state, to neutralize national liberation movements - in 
shon, to return to pre-perestroika times. 
The more important question is why the attempted counterreformation 
failed. It failed despite the fact that it took society unawares as the first 
signs of the imminent coup were ignored by most people. It failed despite 
the split in the democratic forces and their feebleness. Several factors are 
said to have played a role in the failure of the coup: the indecision and 
inconsistency of the conspirators, the lack of real leadership, the absence 
of a basic consensus about the actions to be carried out, vacillation among 
the military and inside the KGB, a fast reaction from Eltsin' s supporters 
who were able to organize their defiance of the putsch, the denouncement 
of the coup by the international community, lack of active suppon for the 
coup from a considerable number of republics, and resistance from the 
public in some of the large cities. A closer examination of some of these 
factors makes it clear, however, that the picture was a rather complex one. 
Consider, for example, the reactions from the republican leaders on August 
19, the first day of the coup. Most of them were patently slow in 
determining their stands, obviously waiting for the situation to clarify. The 
8 
·first reaction of the leaders of the two next-largest republics after Russia, 
Kravchuk in the Ukraine and Nazarbaev in Kazakhstan, was to issue 
appeals for law and order to be kept in their republics, suggesting that 
they did not care about events in Moscow. The Baltic leaders did not 
hesitate for a moment to take advantage of the coup and sever their ties 
with the Soviet Union. "You mind your business, we mind ours", this was 
the leitmotif of their behaviour. The leaders of Azerbaijan and the Central 
Asian republics unequivocally supported the putchists, though they later on 
refused to have anything to do with them. It was only A. Akaev, President 
of Kirgizia, who took a courageous stand and strongly denounced the 
coup, thus putting his political destiny at stake. It is therefore likely that, 
had the conservatives got the upper hand in Moscow, most of the 
republican leaders would have tried their best to find a common language 
and accommodate with the new Union leaders.• 
But we still have the "people's uprising", the "opposition of the masses 
to the coup", as it was presented in the western media. In fact, there was 
nothing of the kind. In the provinces people kept quiet. 7 Attempts to 
organize large-scale strikes failed. Some people welcomed the coup as a 
long awaited means to restore law and order. Others had become sick and 
tired of all these continuing shocks. Only an insignificant part of the 
population participated in protests against the coup. The majority preferred 
to wait and see. 
As for the Army and the KGB, the degree of their democratization should 
not be exaggerated. When General E. Shaposhnikov began searching for 
like-minded people who would support the Russian authorities, he could 
trace only one man, General A. Grachov. It should be noted, however, that 
6 What about the reaction of the main western powers? President Bush and Prime 
Minister Major were the only leaders who stood up resolutely against the coup, 
but even their stance looked somewhat uncertain at first. The other western 
leaders were patently hesitant, and were, like Francois Mitterand, obviously on 
the verge of giving the new authorities in Moscow some kind of recognition. It 
seems likely, therefore, that the world community would soon have adjusted to 
the new situation. 
7 According to opinion polls, on the first day of the conspiracy up to 40 per 
cent of the population in the provinces were in favour of the state of emergency. 
Even in democratic Leningrad it was supported by 20 per cent of the polled. 
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units and individuals in the Anny and the KGB disobeyed or sabotaged 
the orders of the conspirators.' 
However, it was not because they were democratically inclined but 
because they lacked faith in the coup-makers and their prospects of 
success. "The coup failed because instead of Marshal Zhukov we had 
Marshal Yazov", was the explanation given by a fairly well-known 
representative of the ultra-patriotic forces, Colonel Alksnis.' He was 
obviously right to some extent. "The Russian factor" also played a part. 
The Anny would have attacked the civil population in Bakn, Tblisi and 
Vilnius without hesitation. It would have been much more difficult to 
attempt the same in Moscow. Still, the Anny would probably have obeyed 
orders and attacked both the peaceful population and the "White House" 
had the orders been given. But there seem to have been no orders. The 
troops had just been ordered to "enter the city and stay there". 
The defeat of the coup did not, therefore, mark a victory for the 
democratic forces, but the defeat of the conservatives. They lost primarily 
because of their own indecision. They had been too circumspect, waiting 
for uncertain opportunities and expecting a leader to appear in the belief 
that their actions were just the prelude to the main act which never 
materialized. 
In retrospect we can observe the buildup of a new mythology of a 
"people's revolution" and the "courageous defence of the White House". 
A heroic image of Eltsin and his associates is being created. Of course, 
they should be rendered their due. The Russian president and his 
supporters did behave courageously, consistently and with dignity in 
August. All the more when contrasted with Gorbachev's team and 
environment. One should not belittle the heroic deeds of tens of thousands 
of Moscowites who set out to defend the Russian Parliament, marching 
into uncertainty and possibly risking their lives. The reality of the threat 
against the "White House" is still a matter for discussion, but this does 
not detract from the heroic aspects of the events. 
Should one speak about the victory of democracy in August in Russia at 
least if not in the Soviet Union? There seems to be no ground for such 
• The KGB elite detachment "Alfa" refused to take part in the stonning the 
"White House", where Eltsin and his supporters had their headquarters. 
' Argumenty i fakty, No. 32, 1991. 
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an inference. The defeat of the conservatives does not mean that power 
has passed into the hands of the democrats. A danger however lies in the 
fact that the political structure is being filled with new people who are by 
no means dreaming of radical changes in the very mechanism of power. 
In short, one can say that so far the new forces have suffered a success. 
From now on they will be kept responsible for leading society out of the 
crisis and there will be nobody to blame in case of failure. So, the 
moment of truth is still lying ahead. 
4. NEW POUTICAL FORCES 
The events of August have accelerated the reshaping of the political 
landscape both in Russia and in the other republics. As far back as in 
1989-90 it was correct to speak about the antagonism between democrats 
and conservatives, at least in Russia. In some republics, such as the Baltic 
states, -the Ukraine and Moldova, there was a confrontation between the 
national liberation movements and the supporters of a unitary state whose 
stronghold was the communist parties. But from the end of 1990 the 
political landscape became more complex. A new type of polarization had 
emerged. Simultaneously new compromises and unions, sometimes between 
yesterday's adversaries, began to appear. 
Even the CPSU ceased to exist as a monolith. By 1990 orthodox marxist, 
liberal centrist and national separatist movements could easily be discerned 
within its ranks. The Party went on splitting into national republican 
organizations that were used by local leaderships as bridgeheads for 
spreading their own influence. The rise of the Russian Communist Party 
demonstrated the intricate relationship between the old central machinery 
and the Russian party structure. 
Other sectors of the established power apparatuses showed. similar 
separation tendencies. Within the military-industrial complex different 
approaches both to the Union's future and further reforms became 
increasingly evident. Here an influential "directors' lobby" took shape 
which was opposed to . being associated with the CPSU and began to 
search for a new political umbrella. Similar polarization processes got 
under way in the army and the KGB. 
New political trends emerged on the scene. One of them might be defined 
as a great power or imperialist trend which rallied communists and anti-
communists, advocates of maintaining the empire and the return of the 
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"iron hand". This trend was led by the "Soyuz" (Union) group in the 
USSR Supreme Soviet. Similar positions were taken by representatives of 
the Russian communities in the Ukraine (for instance in the Crimea), in 
Moldova, and in the Baltic states. 
Prior to August the democratic movement was in a rather amorphous state. 
The democrats did not succeed in becoming consolidated or in building 
structures similar to the Czech Civic Forum or Poland's "Solidarity". The 
"Democratic Russia" movement enjoyed influence only in a number of big 
cities. The spring of 1991 saw the beginning of a split in the Soviet 
democrats' ranks. The polarization hinged on a number of matters, such 
as the future of the Union, the nature of reforms to be implemented, 
organizational models (a mass party, movement or coalition, and on what 
platform?). No major non-communist parties have ultimately emerged in 
Soviet society. The most numerous in terms of membership, Nikolai 
Travkin's Democratic Party, had a membership of about 35,000 prior to 
August 1991. 
In the spring of 1991 a number of liberal-minded personaliti~s and first-
generation "perestroika advocates", former allies of Gorbache~ including 
A. Yakovlev and E. Shevarnadze joined forces with sotne of the 
democratic leaders, including G. Popov and A. Sobchak and some leaders 
of A. Volski's Scientific and Industrial Union in an attempt to form a 
centrist type of political movement. Their intentions were to rally all the 
reformist personalities and moderate groupings under the same umbrella. 
This was how the formation of the Movement for Democratic Reforms 
was announced. Many people felt, however, that this was part of 
Gorbachev's efforts to extend his power base, and that the Movement for 
Democratic Reform (MDR) was a way of extending the life of the Party 
structures. But there was still another reason why this organization was 
doomed from the very beginning. An all-union organization trying to play 
a uniting role - and this was part of MDR 's purpose - was hardly feasible 
when the Union was disintegrating. 
The August events produced a vacuum where the CPSU had been before. 
What kind of forces and organizations will fill this vacuum? After the 
Communist Party's activities had been suspended in Russia similar 
decisions were taken in a number of other republics. Because of this many 
analysts have come to the conclusion that communism has come to an end 
in post-Soviet society. Indeed, in what used to be the Soviet Union 
communism seems to have ceased to exist in its traditional form, as a 
National Ideology and a basis for the unitary state. 
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But does all this imply that communism will not revive in this society in 
other forms or in a different modification? This ideology is likely to 
continue exerting its influence for a long time on not insignificant sections 
of the population as a levelling mentality and as a combination of certain 
social conceptions. More than seventy years of indoctrination could not 
pass without leaving any trace. Communist atavism may make itself felt 
during the period of transition to economic reforms, and it may serve to 
generate the striving for authoritarian methods of administration. At the 
same time, however, the maintenance of communism as a mass party 
platform appears to be questionable. Communist type parties, whatever 
their name, will be restored at least in Russia. But they will be marginal, 
not numerous and will be supported by people of the older generation. 
However, the formation of new parties of a left-wing, social democratic 
orientation is inevitable. 
At present, indeed, the intention of the old establishment to form parties 
by changing labels is also quite apparent. N. Nazarbaev was the first to 
do this. He declared the dissolution of the Kazakhstan communist party 
and the formation of a Kazakhstan Socialist Party that was composed of 
the old communist organizations with their full membership. 
In the short-term perspective, the new political organizations which may 
come into being on the ruins of the CPSU are most likely to be of 
populist or nationalist tendencies. An example of this is the evolution of 
the Ukrainian communists. Following the August events they turned 
suddenly into national patriots and began to support almost entirely the 
conception of their former opponent - the national patriotic movement 
"Rukh". Similar tendencies were even stronger in Central Asia and 
Azerbaijan. The local leaders there are trying at any cost and under any 
labels to maintain the party infrastructures as supporting pillars of the new 
regimes. Phraseology may change but the essence of authority remains 
intact. 
What is the situation for the democratic movement after August? One 
would expect that the defeat suffered by the conservatives would have 
increased its role. It may be argued that quite the contrary has happened. 
The crisis in the democratic forces has been even more aggravated. It has 
become clear that the original rationale for their existence was first and 
foremost the fight against the CPSU, their opposition to and negation of 
the old regime. The enemy's collapse has deprived the democrats of their 
main impetus. The question of finding a new platform and a new image 
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was raised since it was impossible to exist any longer on the basis of anti-
communism. However, this seems to be a natural process, if we look at 
the evolution of the former opposition forces in Eastern Europe. 
Thus we are on the threshold of building a system of political pluralism. 
Which tendencies will dominate? First of all the former division into 
"democrats" and "conservatives" will become a thing of the past. The very 
notions of "right wing" and "left wing" will gradually acquire a new 
meaning. It seems clear that certain political forces - liberals, social-
democrats, neo-conservatives, christian-democrats - are keen to build their 
conceptions and political structures according to the classical western 
scheme. It should be noted, however, that this process evolves from the 
top rather than from the grass roots, and sometimes in a very artificial 
way. Political party constructions do not always correspond to the social 
trends in society at large. Attempts to build a western-type system of 
political pluralism are made in a society where the "communist" social 
structures are generally still intact. Consequently, there may be concealed 
under the liberal or social-democratic labels quite different and at times 
unexpected elements. 
Does this mean that nationalism in whatever disguise will continue to be 
a dominating force in the post-Soviet political scene for a long time? First 
of all it should be pointed out that the political differentiation in various 
republics and emergent states will not be identical. In most regions the 
national-patriotic movements will, in fact, be the most influential force for 
a time. But when independence is secured these movements will 
disintegrate and new party structures will begin to come into being. This 
process is already under way in the Baltic countries; the Ukraine will soon 
follow suit. Nevertheless in some regions nationalism is likely to hold its 
ground as an influential political trend for a long time. This will be the 
case in regions where there are ethnic and inter-republican contradictions. 
Nationalism could also be used as the base for dictatorship power. 
Everybody is concerned about which political forces will gain the upper 
hand in Russia. In my opinion there are still no grounds to believe that 
Russian nationalism is likely to take shape as a predominant political 
movement or political course in Russia in the near future. Such an 
eventuality would mean the transformation of the Russian Federation into 
a powder keg. At the same time the Russian authorities may none the less 
be expected to pay increased attention to strengthening the idea of Russian 
statehood and Russian self-sufficiency. This is an inevitable reaction to 
separatism and nationalism in the other republics. Yet this factor is not 
14 
sufficient to conclude that Russian nationalism is gathering momentum. It 
should rather be interpreted as an increasing awareness of Russia's special 
interest as a major heir to the Soviet Union. 
In any event the process of attaining a new identity after the Soviet 
empire will be painful for the Russian people. It will be associated with 
the struggle against two extremes - national isolationism ("We must get 
separated from all of them") and great power tendencies ("Russia is 
responsible for all of them. We are not going to let the old Union 
disappear altogether"). 
5. FORMS OF INTER-REPUBUCAN RELATIONS 
It is a thankless task to predict the further scenarios of the development 
of the constituent parts of the former Union when there is no stable 
structure of social interests, when emotions and irrational behaviour have 
come to the forefront and new political forces are only in the early phases 
of self-organization. Some alternatives could, however, be easily ruled out. 
A retum to the unitary state seems impossible. The restoration of the 
party-etatist system would be entirely unthinkable too. Even in the most 
conservative republics communist etatism will gradually be supplanted by 
new structures and by the emerging new political elite. On the .inter-
republican level, the chance of a federal solution has been lost. At the 
same time their absolutely independent development, with all economic . 
relations broken off, appears equally doubtful. 
To what extent do the dramatic versions of post-Soviet society's develop-
ment, such as civil war, a military putsch or military dictatorship or war 
between the republics seem probable? A civil war in Russia in the near 
future seems unlikely, since such confrontation implies the involvement of 
two sides, which have been non-existent so far. But because of the further 
deepening of social differences, the decline in standard of living for a 
certain part of the population, higher unemployment figures, the lack of 
social absorbers in the process of a shock transition to a market economy, 
scenes of mass protest and social unrest are not unlikely in 1992-1993. 
Recent events in Georgia have demonstrated the possibility of civil 
confrontation. Similar events could occur in the Ukraine, in Azerbaijan, 
and in some of the Central Asian republics. 
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In view of this to what extent are wars between the former Soviet 
republics likely? It is hard to imagine which republic would want to 
become involved in an armed confrontation with Russia; the weight class 
of the other republics is too low. In the near future armed conflicts are 
more likely to take place between republics which are already involved in 
territorial or other disputes, such as Kirgizia and U zbekistan. The leaders 
of some republics may stimulate such conflicts in an attempt to create the 
image of an external enemy in order to consolidate their own position. As 
has been demonstrated by the protracted conflict between Armenia and 
Azerbaijan, interethnic conflicts are generally hard to settle without the 
mediation of a third party. But Russia's involvement in this role may have 
negative consequences and even worsen its relations with the conflicting 
parties. What would appear to yield a more effective result is the 
establishment of a multilateral machinery for the settlement of such 
conflicts or the enlisting of international organizations for mediation, as 
has been the case in the war between Serbia and Croatia. 
As for the likelihood of a military coup, it is unfeasible on the Common-
wealth scale. It also seems unlikely in Russia itself in the near future. For 
one thing the Soviet military establishment is utter! y inexperienced in 
independent political action. The officers have always been under the 
Party's close supervision. Also the army has its own problems to solve. 
The fact is that at present the former Soviet army is going through one 
of the most painful periods in its history. 
The disparity between the propaganda myth about the most mighty army 
in the world and the really grievous conditions of rank and file officers 
has become more apparent. The "Afghan syndrome" that has not yet been 
overcome in the army is supplemented with the inferiority complex 
engendered by the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Eastern Europe 
without the preliminary preparation of any appropriate infrastructure in 
their own country. The sentiments which evidently prevail in servicemen's 
circles make up a complex tangle of social and political dissatisfaction. 
There is a widespread feeling of alienation resulting from the criticism the 
army has been subjected to by the democratic forces. The officers are 
politically disoriented and frustrated by the evolving signs of national 
division. A considerable number of servicemen supported "departization". 
On the other hand, the existing great-power sentiments and longing for a 
strong regime among fairly wide sections of the officers cannot be 
ignored. 
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In the autumn of 1991 a thorough purge was undertaken in the Soviet 
army. The upper echelon of the military, which was formerly associated 
with the communist system, has been retiring from the scene. This 
generation of the officer class is not likely to muster its strength for 
resistance. The way to the top has been cleared for the next generation of 
servicemen. They are less ideologically-minded, more pragmatic and self-
sufficient. It is precisely this military echelon that may become an 
independent political force if there is no proper civil control of the army. 
It is much more likely that there will be an escalation of interethnic rather 
than of social conflicts. They have already occurred in Moldova, Georgia 
and Central Asia. Given the abundance of armaments in the country in 
private possession and the forming paramilitary groupings, such conflicts 
are not only of an armed and bloody character but they may turn into a 
source of constant interrepublican tension. 
Post-soviet society has fallen into a unique trap whose character is largely 
governed by the versatile, circular nature of its further development. On 
the one hand, separatism in the individual republics has deepened to such 
an extent that it will be very difficult to transform the new Common-
wealth of Independent States into a community with a single centre. On 
the other hand, not a single one of the emergent states can survive 
economically on its own, although Russia and the Ukraine are in a 
somewhat better position. There are also other reasons to doubt the 
possibility of the successful independent development of some of the post-
soviet republics. 10 
What underlies republican separatism? Several factors seem obvious, 
namely: 1) the desire of individual nations to realize their long-suppressed 
national identity and to form their own statehood for its protection; 2) 
attempts by republican leaders to strengthen their own position through 
appeals to separatist sentiments; 3) the emergence of new political elites 
who see a basis for their existence in national statehood. It is far from the 
case that the attainment of national statehood always leads to the 
acceleration and radicalization of reforms. In the Baltic republics the 
breakaway from the centre initially accelerated their advance in this 
10 One of the reasons is the prospect of mass migration of different ethnic groups. 
Thus, 17,4 per cent of the Russians live outside the Russian Federation; the per 
cent of Ukrainians, Byelorussians and Armenians is 15.3, 21 and 33 respectively. 
One should bear in mind the artificiality of the present borders between 
individual republics. 
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direction. But then the refonn process slowed down as the result of 
breaking off economic relations with other post-soviet republics. In many 
republics the attainment of fonnal independence moved the problems of 
democratization arid marketization away from the foreground. On the one 
hand, the striving of people in the communist empire towards their own 
independence was natural and inevitable. But sometimes sovereignty is 
understood as an end in itself. And sometimes one sees the Bolshevist 
wa~ of thinking and behaviour although in another ideological disguise. 
So,what then are the most probable ways that Russia and the other parts 
of the fonner Soviet Union will develop? At the moment, it seems that 
the logic of disintegration which is largely beyond control predominates 
over any constructive processes. But at the same time post-soviet society 
is no longer a one-tendency entity, and it would be erroneous to tell only 
about its disintegration when speaking about its complex development as 
a whole. It cannot be confined within the framework of one model as 
many people try to do. 
The attempted coup in August brought about the last stage of the Soviet 
Union's disintegration. The old centre virtually ceased to exist. Our society 
has entered the phase of the final breakup of its economic and social 
relations. But there is an obvious need for a certain measure of continuity, 
a bridge between the past and the future. The structures of the new 
Commonwealth of Independent States are an attempt in this direction. The 
establishment of provisional, interim structures encountered specific 
difficulties. First, it was necessary to break down the resistance of the 
Union's fonner power structures which were unwilling to quit the scene 
peacefully and ·voluntarily. Secondly, it was necessary to secure the 
consent of the majority of republican leaders to build a "transitional 
bridge" and to draft a certain "code of conduct" for the transitional period. 
It was the "big three", Gorbachev, Eltsin and Nazarbaev, who undertook 
to tackle these problems. They coped with a part of their tasks. The 
Union's supreme body of state authority, the Congress of People's 
Deputies, agreed to retire from political life, without any serious resis-
tance. A first agreement was also reached to form an interim power 
system for the transitional period." The decisive role in the new transitio-
" As a result the following three-storey structure was established: the State 
Council comprising the leaders of the nine republics including Gorbachev; a new 
two-chamber Supreme Soviet, which was to be formed on a quota basis by 
individual republics, and an Interrepublican Economic Committee responsible for 
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nal power system was transferred to the State Council, i.e. to the "Club 
of Presidents". Legislative assemblies acquired purely decorative functions. 
The Union government, the great bulk of which supported the coup, was 
dissolved. Only four union posts - the Minister for Foreign Affairs, 
Minister for Internal Affairs, Defence Minister and KGB Chairman - were 
maintained and new nominees took over office (mainly on the recommen-
dation of the Russian administration). 
The interim Centre had to decide whether to make arrangements for the 
fmal divorce and the division of property, or for a new marriage. "The big 
three" undertook to pursue a course towards forming a new confederation. 
The first step in forming a Commonwealth of Independent States was to 
build an economic union. The ad hoc negotiations held in Alma Ata in 
October 1991 yielded encouraging results at firSt. Thirteen republics 
expressed their desire to join this community in one form or another. But 
then things came to a standstill. Some of the Russian authorities failed to 
accept the terms of the economic agreement which they regarded as 
unfavourable for Russia. 12 However, an agreement concerning a new 
economic community was finally signed. The Gorbachev team even began 
drafting an agreement on a political union. But it was clear to everyone 
how shaky and unstable a new structure was going to be, and how 
stubbornly the republics were striving to attain independence, at times 
regardless of any logic or common sense. 
It is an open question, therefore, whether the emerging Commonwealth of 
Independent States in lieu of the old Union will be a long-term venture. 
Th~tically it makes it possible to combine the longing of individual 
republics for self-rule and the joint implementation of those functions 
which the republics would find it difficult to carry out separately (a 
collective security system, control over nuclear forces and nuclear energy, 
transport and communications). But the attempts to set up a confederation 
of the post-Soviet republics will meet with serious difficulties. The 
community will consist of states with different political systems and 
cultures (democratic, national-populist, national-partocratic), varying socio-
economic structures, and the general level of development is quite 
different. Conflicts between the republics appear to be inevitable. The 
coordinating the economic strategies of the nine republics. 
12 
"Russia will become again a milk cow for all the other republics which are 
already parasitizing on her", Russian Vice President A. Rutskoi said in this 
connection. 
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members of the Commonwealth will even find it difficult to coordinate 
their economic strategies because their· leaders adhere to different views 
on the market and privatization. Instability will be inherent in the structure 
because individual leaders will use nationalism as an instrument to 
consolidate their internal position in their respective regions and to 
strengthen their authoritarian regimes. 
The relationship of Russia with the other republics and their leaders 
constitutes a special problem. The republican leaders evidently fear Eltsin's 
rise to power suspecting him of hegemonical and great-power ambitions. 
Immediately following the attempted coup in August the Russian team 
took a number of steps that gave rise to speculation about the emergence 
of a new "Russian imperialism". Reference is made inter alia to the 
warning by Eltsin's press spokesman to the effect that the complete 
breakup of all union structures would raise the question of revising 
common borders. The statement was obviously an attempt to put an end 
to separative tendencies. But the reaction of the republics concerned was 
exactly the reverse. In the Ukraine the statement provoked even more 
intense activity among the nationalist forces and accelerated the republic's 
advance to independence." Nazarbaev made the following comment: "I 
don't know who has whispered it in his ear [i.e. Eltsin's], but the Russian 
leadership has missed a chance to make peace. Everybody looked at him 
[i.e. Eltsin] with confidence. But this was like a fly in the ointment".14 
But the main reason for the discontent of many republican leaders was 
that the Russian authorities nominated their candidates to the key Union 
posts, with the apparent intention of turning the all-union assets into 
Russian property. These actions undertaken by the Eltsin team could be 
understood and explained to a certain extent. Following the discrediting of 
the Union bodies it was urgent that personnel were replaced in the top 
echelons especially in the Army, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the 
KGB in order to rule out the possibility of a new attempts to block the 
reform process. As for the transfer of all-union property on RSFSR 
territory into Russian property, the other republics were doing the same 
" The Ukrainian movement "Rukh" issued the following statement: "The attempt 
aimed at the Ukrainian revival, has given rise once again, just as 72 years ago, 
to a strong reaction now on the part of Russia's democratic leaders who won the 
victory over the putsch. We see again the illusion of Messianism, "Big Brother" 
syndromes and imperial aspirations ... ". 
14 Jzvestiia, September 9, 1991. 
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in their respective territories. But even discounting these specific incidents, 
powerful Russia cannot help provoking fears in the less powerful states 
and emerging republics surrounding it. 
To sum up: the discrepancy in weight class between the individual 
members of the new Commonwealth, the unequal level of economic 
development, the increasingly varied types of social structures, the 
differently balanced political forces, to say nothing about the different 
traditions, cultures and national mentality - all these factors, taken 
together, will prevent the Commonwealth from evolving into a stable 
entity. Indeed, historical experience seems to show that a confederation is 
essentially a traditional form. It tends to develop either into a federation 
or fall to pieces. A complete breakdown of all centralized structures would 
have dire consequences for Russia and the other republics. Among other 
things, it would be necessary to face problems over revision of borders 
and the resulting millions of refugees among the Russians in particular. 
Another effect would be a spiralling of the economic crisis resulting from 
the breaking off of economic relations between the republics. 
Representatives of the Russian government from time to time express the 
view that the process of building a new union should be given secondary 
priority and that Russia should basically proceed further "on its own". The 
unilateral introduction of the price reform in Russia from January 2, 1992, 
obviously resulted from this way of thinking. As the argument goes, 
Russia should proceed to make further radical changes without waiting for 
the other republics, and without wasting time and effort on endless 
arrangements to be agreed upon with other republics. Accordingly, when 
Russia overcomes the crisis and becomes a fully fledged state, this very 
fact will give rise to a rapprochement of the other states. Russian 
isolationism would by no means be an optimum scenario in the develop-
ment of the post-Soviet territories. Russia's independent evolution would 
inevitably mean an increasingly reactionary political system in a number 
of other emerging states, particularly in Central Asia, while the ability of 
the Russian state to exert its influence on them would be further reduced. 
*** 
When thinking about the future of the post-Soviet territories, one should 
not only think in terms of a single model - federation, confederation, 
commonwealth or disintegration. A new pluralistic entity is emerging in 
lieu of Soviet society. Despite apparently chaotic present situation, some 
features of future intra-republican relations have already begun taking 
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shape. In a not quite foreseeable future the Commonwealth of Independent 
States might develop into a multistory structure with elements of federative 
and' confederative types. The structure will look asymmetric - each 
republic or state will try to find its own way of joining it. Such a 
polytypic form of relations will give rise to quite a few coordination 
problems. But the unification of these relations seems unlikely in the 
foreseeable future. Some republics will establish confederative relations 
with each other, some will join an economic community, some will form 
just a military union and the remaining republics will embark upon an 
independent course. 
The future multistory edifice would in no way be a constant structure 
destined to last for long. It would inevitably undergo evolution. Some 
republics might change from federative relations to confederative and vice 
versa. Some states might try to develop independently at first, and later 
establish closer relations with other states. There is no doubt that Russi;t 
will be a single centre of attraction around which relations of different 
types will be built up. However, Russia's participation in any entity will 
require its leadership to display maximum flexibility and to give up any 
hegemonical aspirations to which its partners are extremely sensitive, and 
which could compel them to avoid any alliance with Russia, even if this 
is to their obvious disadvantage. 
One should not underestimate the likelihood of the emergence of new 
centres of attraction, leading to the formation of other regional and 
subregional associations. The idea of a Central Asian Union has been in 
the air for a long time, and Kazakhstan's president Nazarbaev clearly 
claims the role· of leader in this region. Closer forms of cooperation 
between the Baltic states are already emerging. Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn's 
idea of a "Slavonic Union of States" may also be considered. There are 
few doubts about the future rapprochement between Moldova and 
Rumania, possibly in the form of a confederation between the two states. 
In the near future, however, we will evidently have to go through a phase 
of euphoria over national independence. At present, many of the post-
Soviet states are primarily concerned with strengthening their self-
sufficiency. They may be forced, I believe, to seek a union with one 
another by the emergence of an imminent external threat, real or imagined, 
or an utter economic collapse. Meanwhile they are keen to find partners 
among more powerful states rather than allies among their weak equals. 
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The process of regionalization goes beyond the borders of the former 
Soviet Union. At present we can observe a tendency among a number of 
the post -Soviet republics to seek rapprochement with other states based on 
the similarity of the political regimes or their leaders' views, on regional 
interests or national-ethnic or religious sentiments. For example, it is quite 
clear why Kazakhstan, whose leadership advocates authoritarian economic 
modernization, is striving to establish closer economic relations with China 
and South Korea. The reasons for rapprochement between Azerbaijan and 
a number of Central Asian republics with Turkey and Iran are equally 
obvious. 
The international factor plays an important role in the further development 
of the post -Soviet region and in the building therein of new state 
structures. In all of the former Soviet republics a powerful impetus to 
attaining independence is provided by the hope for international assistance, 
including economic aid, to be rendered by the industrialized countries. As 
soon as the republican elites overcome their illusions about forthcoming 
abundant international assistance these republics will enter a new phase of 
their development. Unrestrained separatism will give way to endeavours 
to achieve rapprochement with other republics. The criteria for such 
rapprochement will include first of all socio-political orientation, prospects 
for mutually profitable economic relations, geographical vicinity and 
common ethnic and cultural roots. 
However, the process of achieving stable new structures and relationships 
between the former Soviet republics will take years. This should not come 
as a surprise. Throughout this period the former Soviet area will be a 
turbulent picture. But judging by the way in which events are developing 
today, there is no reason to allege that the Yugoslav bloody scenario will 
inevitably be repeated. It is still possible to avoid it on a large scale 
though the Yugoslav syndrome is likely to be repeated locally. 
What, then, will ultimately emerge in lieu of the former Soviet Union? A 
powerful Eurasian Union? A plurality of mutually hostile states? Or a 
great Russia, again dangerous because of its unpredictable character, 
surrounded by quiet vassals? But internal developments in Russia, and the 
policies of the international community will have decisive influence on the 
fmal outcome of the current phase of turmoil in post-Soviet society. 
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6 .. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
What is the first priority task facing post -Soviet society at the moment? 
"Transition to market, of course", many people will say. This is correct, 
but not entirely, since all attempts in that direction are being impeded by 
the existence of a still greater problem - the one of power. 
This is what makes the situation in the territories of the former Soviet 
Union a unique one. New bodies of supreme power have been elected in 
all the republics and states. In many instances it was the former opposition 
that took the upper hand. However, side by side with the institutions 
symbolizing the continuing changes is the foundation of the old Soviet 
system, which is no longer functioning since it cannot carry on without 
being bolstered by the party and the nomen/datura. Typical of the situation 
is an institutional "cover" with nothing inside - just the lack of local 
power and the absence of a vertical mechanism to execute the decisions 
being adopted. By rephrasing a well-known saying, the situation in the 
former Soviet Union can be described as follows: the existence of absolute 
power leads to stagnation, while the absence of power leads to absolute 
stagnation. In addition, the "cover" of the new political system is one-
sided in all the republics. In typical case it leans towards a presidential 
system of power, with correspondingly weak legislative and judicial 
authorities. This situation may partly be explained by the fact that the new 
structures emerged in 1990, at a time when the position of the communist 
parties was still rather strong. Today, in terms of their composition, neither 
the parliaments nor the judicial bodies reflect the new ratio of public 
forces. Evidently, parliaments in some of the republics will soon be 
pushed aside and some of their functions will be taken over by the 
presidents. Early elections will be held in some places. So far the 
executive branch of the constitutional system has been enhanced without 
serious opposition from any quarter. To a certain extent this trend should 
be understood as the result of critical circumstances which call for prompt 
and efficient management. The problem is, however, to draw the line 
between warranted firmness and authoritarian rule. Some republics, namely 
Georgia, Azerbaijan, Tadjikistan, Turkmenia, Uzbekistan and Moldova, 
have already provided grounds for speculation about the appearance of 
new regimes of personal power. 
It is impossible to create a workable system of power and conduct free 
elections without the existence of an advanced multi-party system. 
However, the establishment of relatively stable parties in post-Soviet 
societies will still take some years, until a new and diversified structure 
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of social interest has emerged. Here we encounter a typical syndrome of 
post-communist society. Oo the one hand, a fresh system of socio-
economic aspirations cannot develop without intensive activity from the 
political parties. On the other hand, the latter's appearance is impeded 
because of the absence of new and· advanced social groupings with clear-
cut interests. 
The next problem is concerned with the kind of leaders who have come 
to power in the post-Soviet republics and states. Today we have leaders 
of roughly two types: those who have emerged from the depth of the 
party and nomen/datura system; and those who were previously opposed 
to that system. Conspicuous among the ftrst group is Boris Eltsin, who 
ventured to break away from the party structures surrounding him when 
the fonner power structures were still strong. Because of this he has so 
far been credited with great trust from the masses enabling him to go 
ahead with his course. The rest of the nomenklatura type of leaders left 
the sinking party ship only at the very last moment. Their turning into 
democrats therefore looks somewhat unreal or unconvincing. As for the 
other type of leaders, they came to power on a wave of anti-communist 
and nationalist and populist demagoguery (Landsbergis in Lithuania, 
Gamsakhurdia in Georgia, Snegur in Moldova). They have continued using 
the same type of emotional sym holism, while the new situation calls for 
the leadership to drop primitive ideologization and revolutionarism for 
pragmatic down-to-earth policies. 
After Gorbachev's demise from the political scene, post-Soviet politics is 
heavily influenced by three of the republican leaders, namely Eltsin, 
Nazarbaev and Kravchuk. Their position is strengthened by the fact that 
they each have the support of a large republic. The ftrst two at any rate 
have proved to be outstanding and original political ftgures. 
The foremost of the three is of course Boris Eltsin. His stance regarding 
the future interrelationship between Russia and the other post-Soviet 
republics has so far been ambiguous. Although he has supported the new 
Commonwealth of. Independent Nations, he might still opt for Russian 
isolationism, or develop the claim that Russia is the sole legitimate 
successor of the Soviet Union. 
In pursuing his internal policy Eltsin is faced with a vicious circle. As 
long as he enjoys popularity and the people's support he must proceed 
without delay with further radical economic reforms. But this very process, 
which started with the liberalization of most prices on 2 January 1992, 
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will most certainly erode his popularity. He is expected to perfonn 
miracles or at least make constructive and swift changes, not least in the 
economic sphere, whereas any substantial improvement will take years to 
materialize. The Russian leader's drama lies in this simple fact. 
Eltsin should not be treated in a simplified way, as a "populist" or a 
potential "iron hand". He is an outstanding political personality capable of 
taking extraordinary decisions. At the same time it should be borne in 
mind that Eltsin's whole life experience and his previous career have left 
their stamp on him, limiting his abilities as the architect of a new system. 
Let us look at Nazarbaev, an important and influential leader. At present 
he seems to be in favour of the confederation. The considerable number of 
Russians living in Kazakhstan restrains him from displaying too strong 
separatist attitudes. Judging not only by his declarations, however, 
Nazarbaev is trying to pursue a fairly independent policy and his 
ambitions are not confined to his own republic alone. He is more 
unpredictable than Eltsin and is capable of manoeuvreing to a greater 
extent according to a continuously changing balance of forces. 
Of the "big three" the Ukrainian leader Kravchuk is noted for being the 
most inconsistent politically, the reason for this lying in the intricate split 
of forces in the republic. In any event he has abandoned his communist 
and federalist affections with ease and turned into a supporter of 
liberalization and the complete independence of the Ukraine. This stance 
also secured him the victory in the elections for the presidency. Kravchuk 
will have to take into account the separatist position of the republic's main 
political force, the "Rukh" movement. In addition, he himself has no 
objection to playing up the idea of full independence in order to 
strengthen his personal independence of Moscow. But as a result relations 
between Russia and the Ukraine have bec.ome the most complicated factor 
in building a new community. 
As for the other republics, their future stance will be heavily influenced 
by the position and policies of the "big three", although not ·Only the 
leaders are important, but also the political elite as a whole. In a number 
of republics (Azerbaijan and Central Asia) the former nomen/datura 
groups, while trying to change their ideological tendencies, continue to be 
in power. One should not have any illusions as to their reformist incli-
nations. But it is also unlikely that such opportunities might exist within 
the national-patriotic opposition movements. 
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Another possible trap is related to the very fact of the former opposition's 
accession to power. "Opposition in power" in post-communist society is 
worth a special analysis of its own. This phenomenon will have a decisive 
influence on any further progress, considering that decisions will have to 
be made by people who have no or only limited experience in politics and 
administration. They are people who introduce into the administration their 
old behavioral stereotypes, i.e. elements of dissidence, disobedience, 
opposition and antagonism. However, the more serious questions are who 
will supplant them in society, who will play the role of a new opposition? 
Who will oppose Eltsin, Nazarbaev, Kravchuk, Landsbergis from the left 
and tjle right? It is evident that it is no use thinking about building civil 
society without a real opposition to the governments in power. 
Finally, there is yet another trap which is far from being the last, but is 
probably the most serious one in the further development of post-Soviet 
society. I have in mind the danger of a neo-communist syndrome recurring 
in any form. This may include putting the cart before the horse, i.e. 
attempt to make society bypass the necessary transformation stages by 
means of using methods based on strength. It may also mean the 
recurrence of political intolerance, giving top priority to loyalty and 
"democratic" or "patriotic" criteria to the detriment of professional skills 
in the selection of the new cadres. However, the most serious ordeal 
seems to be the necessity of overcoming the purely Bolshevik temptation 
to rush through processes that must develop naturally. In contrast to 
Western societies which have their internal sources of self-renewal, the 
post-communist structures need to be given an impetus, a resolute pressure 
from outside in order to· transform. But what are the limits to this 
pressure? Could it give rise to a new type of authoritarianism since there 
is a base and traditions for this? 
Unfortunately, there have been more questions than answers so far. 
Nevertheless there is no need to conclude the discussion of the future of 
the post-Soviet territories solely on a sad tone. It is clear that these 
societies have entered a complicated epoch, full of inevitable conflicts and 
struggles. There will, no doubt, be more serious ordeals in the future, 
disappointments in the new leaders and frustration resulting from the 
unfulfillment of the illusions arising from the present revolutionary 
enthusiasm. It is likely that failures and setbacks, even dramatic confron-
tations will be encountered in the future. But one thing should be stated 
with confidence right away. It is no longer possible in our society to 
revive communist myths or return to the past. 
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